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1. Discourse: Structure, Subject, Object 
According to Lacan the notion of discourse should both be associated with and 
distinguished from those of speech and language. By way of approximation, we could 
suggest that discourse lies in between the virtuality of language as a differential system 
of oppositions among signifiers and the actuality of speech as expressed by an individual 
subject. On the one hand, discourse is primarily a discourse without speech, or actual 
utterances, and their “thirst for meaning”.1 It is supported and maintained by language as 
a virtual signifying structure fundamentally unconcerned with meaning. Yet, on the other 
hand, discourse cannot be reduced to the virtual signifying structure. In fact, speech 
lodges itself within discourse and not simply language tout-court. Discourse can thus 
overall be defined as a linguistic structure that “goes well beyond speech”, where speech 
“is always more or less occasional”.2 However, at the same time, it is as a particular 
operation of language – which, for Lacan, is not the only possible outcome of the 
linguistic structure – that discourse “governs anything that at any given moment is 
capable of emerging as speech”.3  
At its simplest, the linguistic structure amounts to a battery of signifiers (S2) that 
are as such articulated with one another and can be considered from the outset as a 
network paving the way for every kind of knowledge. As Lacan puts it, “we have no right, 
ever, to take [the signifying battery] as dispersed, as not already forming a network of 
what is called knowledge”.4 We should importantly specify that this basic signifying 
articulation is not an underlying essence but, following Deleuze who here well captures 
Lacan’s sui generis structuralism, a combinatory system of signifiers, which taken 
individually have no form, signification, or content.5 We should also add that the battery of 
signifiers thus rests just on differential relations that both determine it and leave it as 
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such – as differential – undetermined with regard to its properties. Following Milner, 
structure is difference but, by the same token, “structure in general does not have any 
property”.6 
What happens on the level of discourse – or, better, at its point of origin – is that 
the linguistic structure as the battery of signifiers (S2) is further articulated by the 
intervention of a so-called master signifier (S1). The master signifier, which is somehow 
external to the battery yet does not transcend it, intervenes on a signifier (any signifier) 
of the battery by representing for this signifier the subject as linguistically split ($). Lacan 
argues that this operation, or representation, makes the linguistic structure revolve 
around “certain fundamental relations”, which render it more “stable”.7 Yet such a 
discursive stabilisation immediately turns out to be rather precarious. While through 
discourse language manages to lay the ground for the idea of wholeness, whereby 
structure could be totalised and difference transformed into sameness, it also 
concomitantly shows that “even in the world of discourse nothing is all [tout]” and that 
“‘all’ as such is self-refuting”.8 As Lacan explains in Seminar XVIII, discourse is therefore 
always a semblance.9 
We should develop this pivotal point concerning the oscillation between discursive 
stabilisation and its inherent precariousness from three perspectives. First, it is only with 
discourse that knowledge in the strict sense of symbolic savoir emerges, that is, as 
distinct from both the proto-symbolic (and pre-subjective) networks it presupposes on 
the level of the virtual signifying structure and the imaginary knowledge (connaissance) it 
gives rise to on the level of the “thirst for meaning” and the idea of wholeness.10 The 
master signifier (S1) as the anchoring point of an otherwise purely differential linguistic 
structure ensures that, given the nature of structure where there are no autonomous 
signifiers, the split subject is not only represented for one of the signifiers of the battery 
but, by extension, for the battery itself. This consolidates structure especially if we 
consider that through the same process any signifier of the battery also represents the 
split subject for any other signifier in it.11 
Yet, for Lacan, the resulting discursive knowledge (the battery of signifiers in 
which the subject is being represented), which he also closely links with the so-called 
big Other, can never be a meta-language or ultimate Logos. Put simply, it cannot contain 
itself as a One-All. Discursive knowledge “unfolds of its own accord”.12 It even actually 
speaks all by itself as the unconscious of the subject – and this is the empirical starting 
point of psychoanalysis. But it does not know itself. Or, which is the same, it does not 
know that it knows. 
Second, it is only with discourse that the subject arises as distinguished from what 
Lacan calls the pre-subjective “living individual”,13 or human animal. In this sense, “there 
is something that becomes present by virtue of the fact that all determination of the 
subject, and therefore of thought, depends on discourse”.14 That is to say that the master 
signifier’s representation of the subject for the signifying battery as discursive knowledge 
succeeds in founding the subject as the “supposition” or “hypokeimenon” of that 
knowledge. The same operation in turn retroactively marks the living individual and its 
physiological predisposition for language as the material locus of the subject. In short, 
the virtual linguistic structure – however already transiently embodied in the human 
animal’s concrete utterances – now exists through the subject.  
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Yet, at the same time, it is precisely the subject’s status of speaking being that 
confines him to being nothing more than an “effect of language”,15 an interval or gap 
between the signifiers, whose emergence and disappearance eventually coincide. The 
subject’s actual speech is fundamentally spoken by language. In other words, while the 
subject becomes the necessary and sufficient property of the linguistic structure – which, 
as a differentiality devoid of properties, does otherwise continuously run the risk of 
voiding itself – he is nonetheless just “externally included” in discourse as different from 
it.16 
This very predicament initiates the subject’s desire for a totally transparent 
knowledge (connaissance) that would know itself. The subject first projects this 
connaissance onto discursive knowledge as the supposed “place where everything that 
has happened, that is known”17 – in this sense, the big Other that symbolically knows 
without knowing itself is the place where imaginary knowledge is illusorily articulated as 
One. But, eventually, it is the subject as self-conscious ego and his allegedly self-
sufficient speech that aims at becoming the “little master”18 of connaissance. 
Third, it is only with discourse that jouissance as inextricable from language in 
general – from the linguistic structure as devoid of properties – is circumscribed as an 
object, the so-called object a. But the object a is never truly “nameable”.19 As Deleuze 
puts it, we are here dealing with an “object = x” that as such “is always displaced in 
relation to itself”, an empty square or zero.20 In Lacan’s not too dissimilar terms, the 
object a therefore constitutes the inevitable “loss” that effectively “comes out” [sort] of 
the trajectory of discourse as a linguistic operation.21 
 More to the point, on the one hand, the object a becomes the affective source and 
support of the linguistically split subject ($). It stands as the object-cause of his desire – 
which as the desire for a knowledge that would know itself is always also a desire for a 
sexual knowledge that, by retrieving the object, would grant access to an absolute 
jouissance imagined as perfect satisfaction and happiness. Yet, on the other hand, the 
speaking subject that is being represented by a signifier for another signifier can in this 
way map himself onto the object a only as an elusive want-to-be [manque-à-être]. 
Indeed, the subject in turn represents his fleeting emergence as vanishing in the object a 
he posits as lost. He identifies with the missing object that thus causes him as nothing 
other than the desire to recuperate it. A semblance of subjective identity, which Lacan 
refers to as “fantasy”, can therefore be paradoxically achieved only by staging the loss of 
a mythical identity that was never there to begin with. It is this divided identity – soon 
repressed since it reveals a structural non-autonomy – that lies at the basis of the 
subject’s misrecognition of himself as a self-conscious ego that could master knowledge. 
In other words, discourse does not simply “go around in circles” in a smooth way.22 
Again, in spite of the fact that it stabilises the linguistic structure, discourse cannot be 
totalised, and this is more specifically exposed by the object a as the discursive 
production of a delimited loss. At the same time and for the same reason the object a 
also works as an exit that indicates the discursive apparatus’s “point of insertion”23 on the 
biological materiality of Homo sapiens. 
 
2. Jouissance and the Entropy of the Anthropos 
We now need to consider how this exit does not transgressively open onto a 
primordial field of perfect satisfaction – although discourse retrospectively creates this 
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structural mirage through the object a – but instead on an already entropic dimension of 
jouissance that is pre-discursive yet not pre-linguistic. 
This highly speculative excursus into what, in Seminar XVII, Lacan names 
anthropie24 – the entropy of the anthropos – is required if we want to correctly assess 
the significance of his notion of discourse for politics.25 In fact we are told that, on a first 
level, psychoanalysis can and should contribute to politics insofar as every discourse 
necessarily amounts to a discourse of jouissance.26 Different discourses are in the end 
different ways of dealing socially and politically with the constant of jouissance as a loss. 
But, on a second and more precise level, psychoanalysis is also and especially involved 
with politics because “the idea that knowledge can make a whole [totalité]”, which is 
“immanent to the political as such” (and exacerbated by a discourse that places 
knowledge in its dominant position), ultimately rests on nothing other than the imaginary 
idea of the body as grounded on a self-contained “good form of satisfaction”.27  
Let us summarise what we have acquired so far with regard to the notion of 
discourse:  
a) There is no discourse prior to the cleavage between the master signifier (S1) and 
the battery of signifiers (S2), which is thereby instituted as a knowledge that does 
not know itself. 
b) The subject ($) as that which S1 represents for S2 amounts to an effect of the 
stabilisation of language into discourse, of which he constitutes an integral 
function.  
c) The object a – without which the subject’s appearance as $ would coincide with his 
disappearance – should itself be seen as a concomitant discursive product that is 
both “essential” to discourse and “most opaque” to the extent that it circumscribes 
jouissance as supposedly lost.28 
Throughout his treatment of discourse in Seminar XVII, Lacan assumes that the 
relation between language and jouissance nonetheless precedes the emergence of 
discourse. On the one hand, jouissance always goes together with language. They are the 
two sides of the same coin. There is no language without jouissance and vice versa. Any 
conjecture about extra- or pre-linguistic jouissance remains as unwarranted as any 
inference on the origins of language. On the other hand, and for the same reason, there is 
pre-discursive jouissance precisely insofar as there is pre-discursive language. 
Psychoanalysis can venture into this territory thanks to the “gap” or “hole” of discourse 
provided by the object a.29 Here Lacan also evokes a “jouissance of the body itself”.30 This 
must not be confused with the discursively constructed and retroactive mirage of an 
absolute jouissance as a perfect corporeal self-satisfaction untainted by language, since 
it solely concerns the sheer impact that the as yet non-discursive signifying articulation 
has upon the organism of the human animal. As stated elsewhere in Seminar XVII, “it is 
well and truly as bound to the very origin of the signifier’s coming into play that it is 
possible to speak of jouissance” – an origin about which Lacan controversially vetoes any 
enquiry31 and of which the assured basic consequence is the inextricability of language 
and jouissance.32 
More to the point, the impact of signifiers on the body of Homo sapiens primarily 
involves that sexual reproduction and the preservation of the species is problematic and 
far from guaranteed. In short, language cannot straightforwardly represent sex, or, in 
Lacanian jargon, “there is no sexual relationship” as a representable ratio between the 
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two sexes – or also, sex remains meaningless. At bottom, jouissance thus amounts to a 
species-specific, that is, linguistic, kind of enhanced entropy revolving around the 
fortuitous biological maladjustment of the sexuality of a specific primate (jouissance 
“only comes into play by chance, an initial contingency, an accident”; “it is only through 
[an] effect of entropy, through [a] wasting, that jouissance acquires a status”33).  Or, from 
a simplified and more phenomenological perspective, the jouissance of the body itself 
corresponds to a basic psychosomatic “suffering” that characterises the sexuality of the 
human animal as the absence of the sexual relationship. This pre-discursive absence is 
sublated, but also maintained as such, through discourse thanks to convoluted symbolic 
detours (Freud’s Oedipus and castration complexes and Lacan’s formalisation of them as 
a “phallic function”). In other words, while object a is an affective-psychic construct that 
discursively delimits jouissance as a loss and thus as a potentially retrievable full 
presence, non-delimited jouissance was never at any stage a primordial libidinal Thing 
subsequently obliterated by language. Instead it should be understood as a random 
dispersive “irruption” or “falling”34 that, running parallel to the contingency of language as 
such, complicated non-linguistic life as an already volatile homeostatic equilibrium. 
Few commentators have dwelt on the manifest fact that long passages of Seminar 
XVII are devoted to an enlightening – albeit intricate and fragmentary – updating of 
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Here Lacan seems to be assuming that a careful 
consideration of the role of the object a in discourse in general, and of the different 
economies of jouissance instantiated socio-politically by particular discourses, cannot do 
without the meta-psychological framework of anthropie. Indeed, his main argument 
about the now hegemonic capitalist co-optation of science and of the bureaucratic “all-
knowledge”35 of the university discourse – that it somehow manages to pretend to stop 
the circulation of jouissance as entropic by means of the accumulation of surplus-value 
and the imposition of a “shameless” ideology of compulsory and homogenising fake 
happiness (the “myth” of “knowing how to live”)36 – makes little or no sense if we leave 
aside these presuppositions. 
 
3. Undeadness and the Death Drive 
As early as his first two Seminars (1953-55) Lacan insists on the close link between 
life, entropy, and language in the context of what, for lack of a better word and following 
the materialist Darwinism of Stephen Jay Gould, we could call the “natural history” of the 
sexually disadapted animal. As I argued elsewhere,37 Lacan moves from the Freudian 
assumption that life is a “blister” characterised by its aptitude for death, or better, a 
homeostatic “swelling” or “bubble” that at the same time has a tendency to disaggregate 
itself and reach an inorganic state.38 However, against Freud’s positivist essentialism, for 
which this process nonetheless presupposes quanta of vital energy, or specifically of 
sexual libido, as a substratum, Lacan postulates that the phenomenon of life as an 
accidental emergence remains utterly impenetrable to us. All we can retroactively know 
about it is by means of metabolism, “the balance sheet, what goes in and what comes 
out”, whereby the accumulation, conservation, and consumption of energy can be posited 
only as a symbolic notion.39  
Given this framework, non-human life stands for nothing more than a precarious 
homeostat that in conserving energy nonetheless moves towards entropy, a progressive 
degradation or loss of energy. On a first level, any increase in excitation – however 
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needed to maintain an energetic balance – is associated by the organism with unpleasure 
and any return to homeostasis that removes excitation with pleasure (Freud’s pleasure 
principle). But, on a second level, individual non-human forms of life are for the same 
reason in a more comprehensive sense always “already dead”, or better undead, since 
the species – the replication of the homeostat – is “the only thing to be perpetuated” 
through them.40 That is to say, the pleasure principle as aiming at the removal of 
excitation in order to sustain homeostasis (life) ultimately corresponds or at least is from 
the outset fully subsumed under a death instinct as entropy (Freud’s “beyond the 
pleasure principle”) – which will in turn be entirely unfolded with the extinction of the 
species at stake and the eventual disappearance of life as such but is already operative 
within the individual organism. Bluntly put, as soon as we dispose of presumed quanta of 
vital energy present in life as a substantial substratum, or Thing, life is not really alive, 
that is to say, there is an indifferentiation between life and death at the level of individual 
forms of life.41 As Jean Hyppolite has it in one of his brilliant interventions in Seminar I, 
“the animal is bound by death when he makes love, but he doesn’t know anything about 
it”.42 
Lacan’s basic hypothesis here is that human life as sexually problematic 
contingently disrupts such a pattern and renders it even more paradoxical. In his work of 
the 1950s, the main focus in this regard is on the perturbed imaginary of the human 
animal. On the one hand, the non-human animal as undead would be hardwired to 
smoothly recognise the image of the body of another member of the same species as a 
whole form, or Gestalt, and the sexual partner would thus be sought and found as a “key” 
seeks and finds a “keyhole”.43 On the other, the human animal first and foremost 
libidinally identifies with its own specular image – which it also projects onto the 
counterpart – that is, it alienates itself into an ideal image of completeness that it cannot 
attain. According to Lacan, this state of affairs originates from an attempt to compensate 
for a biological “lack of adaptation”44 of the organism of Homo sapiens, which he 
evolutionarily links with a prematurity of birth (our “foetalised traits”45) and an ensuing 
libidinal prematurity subsequently retained as sexual neoteny. For our present purposes, 
the crucial point at stake is that the specular/ideal image the human animal 
narcissistically loves and (self-)aggressively vies with is also instituted as an “image of 
death”.46 This is the case precisely because the unattainable specular/ideal image – which 
as unattainable already marks our finitude – concomitantly offers an image of, so to 
speak, adapted homeostasis or equilibrium that in the end coincides with the always 
already dead life of animals. The animal’s death instinct – the individual organism’s 
utterly unselfish submission to the perpetuation of the life of the species – turns into the 
human animal’s death drive as an insistent search for an unobtainable ideal of perfection 
mistakenly derived from what is actually nothing other than undeadness. 
In other words, in his early Seminars Lacan already understands the field of 
human sexuality as both irreparably flawed and as such nonetheless sustained by a 
death drive that complicates the animal death instinct. More importantly, the gap that is 
produced by the evolutionarily contingent “deviation” of the human animal’s relation to 
the species-specific Gestalt is both the place where “death makes itself felt”47 imaginarily 
and the originating cause of symbolic repetition. In Seminar II, Lacan sketches an account 
of this oscillation in terms of entropy. In nature energy always tends in the direction of 
entropy as “an equalisation of levels of difference”,48 or, we may say, indifferentiation. If 
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left alone, the perturbed imaginary of Homo sapiens would immediately lead to a 
maximisation of entropy – or, in more colourful terms, the collective suicide of the 
species by means of a mutual extermination of its members carried out in the name of a 
quest for an imagined perfection. But insofar as the same predicament (the perturbed 
imaginary) gives rise to a symbolic order established by language as a field of 
knowledge, “to the extent that the information increases, the difference in levels becomes 
more differentiated”.49 Now, if we take the symbolic order as the pseudo-environment of 
the human animal and its manipulations of nature, this very increase in information can 
be seen as itself inserted into the natural degradation of energy – that is, entropy as the 
equalisation of levels of energetic difference. In this way, it “will cause the general level 
of the energy to rise again”.50  
Lacan does not develop this daring argument any further. However, it seems to me 
unequivocal that what he has in mind at this stage is that the human death drive 
somehow counterbalances entropy, if not slows it down, thereby prolonging or at least 
entangling the always-already terminal trajectory of the animal death instinct. In other 
words, the death drive as the linguistically repetitive search for the animal undead 
imagined as perfection ends up resisting its own goal. As I suggested on other 
occasions,51 against doxastic readings, the death drive therefore primarily amounts to a 
conservation principle. It temporarily suspends the indiscernibility of animal life from the 
undead precisely by turning (the potential maximisation of) entropy itself into a 
symbolically lived experience.52 All this is paradigmatically evidenced by one of the most 
seminal empirical discoveries of the psychoanalytic clinic, the human-all-too-human 
compulsion to undergo or stage unpleasurable – that is, anti-entropic – situations again 
and again, and thus enjoy them. Outside psychoanalysis, it can also be intuitively grasped 
through the cross-cultural inclination to liken the pleasure of sexual orgasm to a “little 
death”. We do indeed know we are bound by death when we make love. 
In his early Seminars, Lacan never loses sight of the fact that Homo sapiens 
nonetheless still remains an essentially self-destructive primate. The perturbed 
imaginary and the possibility of almost instantaneous extinction that goes with it always 
loom in the background. He is also well aware that the symbolic containment of entropy 
is itself inherently fragile. It does not simply ensue from language as such but 
necessitates intricate intersubjective “pacts” that regulate the death drive through the 
mutual recognition of desire – which he will conceptualise in the 1960s-’70s in terms of 
discourse. After all, the death drive as a conservation principle cannot but preserve itself 
at the same time as a death drive entwined with our distinctive aggressiveness aimed at 
obtaining an illusory ideal. 
 However, Lacan here fails to elucidate two crucial related issues. We can begin to 
unravel them through his later treatment of discursive jouissance and knowledge in 
Seminar XVII. To put it very simply, first, language is from the outset part of the human 
animal’s impasse and not only of its tentative solution. The biological-imaginary “primitive 
impotence”53 of Homo sapiens should always be thought together with language as the 
absence of the sexual relationship. Second, the tentative solution provided by language 
also as such contributes to the problem. Language both enhances entropy, because of 
the absence of the sexual relationship as the impossibility of the effortless replication of 
the animal homeostat, and slows it down, thanks to the increasing differentiation of 
information as knowledge and its basic sedimentation in the death drive. But, in addition 
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to that, the very slowing down of entropy – the separation of linguistic life from animal 
undeadness – itself participates in if not enhances the initial enhancement of entropy.  
In other words, there is a structural entropic feature of discourse itself that 
attempts to totalise knowledge – or differentiation – as ultimately a sexual knowledge of 
the sexual relationship that does not exist (where, again, such an absence as the original 
cause of the human enhancement of entropy also at the same time lies at the basis of 
knowledge as what slows it down). This sexual knowledge is meant to achieve the ideal 
perfection we imagine in the animal, which is actually nothing other than undeadness, 
and which, moreover, would in our case decree the extinction of the species, or 
maximisation of entropy. And yet, with another dialectical turn of the screw, the 
attempted totalisation of knowledge – epitomised by the capitalist-university capture of it 
and its contradictory brandishing of “happiness”54 as an elimination of loss – is itself 
unviable. There is no meta-language and the enhancement of entropy (indifferentiation) 
through its slowing down (differentiation) concomitantly promotes a supplementary 
slowing down of entropy (further differentiation). Loosely following Marx, let us 
tentatively define this acephalic knowledge as a “general intellect” as yet unabsorbed by 
capital and identify it with a quintessential domain for thinking a de-totalising politics of 
incompleteness from this speculative perspective. Let us also bear in mind that, while 
the enhancement of entropy through knowledge may turn out to be truly irreversible, 
today, it first and foremost coalesces in a composite, widespread, and – only at first sight 
– oddly titillating phantasmatic scenario of nuclear holocaust, environmental point of no 
return, extinction-level pandemic, super-intelligent AI takeover, and so on. 
 
4. Knowledge and Plus-de-Jouir 
In Seminar XVII, Lacan cautiously suspends any final deliberation on the in-itself of 
the undeadness of non-human life and its sexuality (the key and keyhole scheme). After 
all, more agnostically, there could hypothetically exist a jouissance of the plant, or of the 
oyster and the beaver, as “perhaps infinitely painful”, although in all cases – “the oyster 
and the beaver are at the same level of the plant” – we will never know anything about 
this “formless” level of jouissance and we can speak of jouissance in the strict sense only 
with regard to the coming into play of language.55 
On the other hand, Lacan still firmly moves from the assumption that symbolically 
– that is, retroactively – life is a “bubble” waning “toward a return to the inanimate”.56 In 
this context, linguistic life as the absence of the sexual relationship should first and 
foremost be thought of as a jouissance that is actually nothing other than “the loss of 
sexual jouissance”57 – which is to say, an enhancement and potential maximisation of the 
entropy already characterising what appears to be, to the best of our knowledge, the 
smooth replication of the non-human homeostat. On this initial human level, “the path 
toward death is nothing other than what is called jouissance”.58  
Yet, at the same time and with the very same movement, a “primitive” relationship 
between jouissance as the absence of the sexual relationship and knowledge is already 
established.59 Language goes together with the absence of the sexual relationship but, 
conversely, the absence of the sexual relationship cannot ever be separated from what 
we earlier referred to as proto-symbolic networks of knowledge, or an as yet pre-
discursive signifying articulation. The human return to the inanimate always “implies 
knowledge”.60 However, concomitantly, “knowledge is what makes [human] life stop at a 
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certain limit in the direction of jouissance” as the path toward death.61 Knowledge 
manages to achieve this to the extent that the primitive relationship between jouissance 
and knowledge can also stabilise itself into discourse as the “representation of the lack 
of jouissance”.62 In other words, jouissance as the purely entropic loss of sexual 
jouissance – jouissance as the absence of the sexual relationship – is represented as the 
“loss of the object”,63 the object a, instituted as a discursive gap or hole.  
 We need to dwell on this dialectically complex but central issue. The key point 
about discourse as revolving around the lost object is that it turns primitive and purely 
entropic jouissance into what Lacan calls plus-de-jouir. Given the evident polysemy of 
this neologism we should avoid hastily translating it as “surplus” jouissance, which more 
often than not evokes something additional. First and foremost, through the object a, 
jouissance is instead given as a jouissance that is “no more” (plus de). Here the linguistic 
free fall of jouissance as the purely entropic absence of the sexual relationship is 
contained – yet not eliminated – as the absence of jouissance.64 But by the very same 
token the absence of jouissance retroactively converts primitive and purely entropic 
jouissance into the ideal of an absolute presence that was lost and could be recuperated. 
We can thus understand plus-de-jouir as a surplus, or extra, in terms of a “more” (plus 
de) only in relation to this mythical albeit structural horizon. Or, alternatively, provided 
that the surplus or extra is thought of as nothing more than a waste, plus-de-jouir also 
denotes the really existing jouissance of the drive that is nonetheless actualised as a 
useless by-product of discursiveness in and through the very absence of jouissance; this 
waste product is the absence of jouissance as the actualisation of the lost object. 
 Lacan’s threefold plus-de-jouir as a discursive “no more” jouissance, “more” 
jouissance, and jouissance qua object-waste elaborates on the pleasure principle and its 
beyond – that is, the ultimate inclusion of pleasure as the removal of unpleasure into the 
death instinct – to the point of profoundly contesting the “Freudian fable”.65 We could say 
that what really matters here, at least with regard to the speaking animal, happens 
beside the pleasure principle and its beyond. First, pre-discursive yet linguistic 
jouissance amounts to an unmediated suffering for the absence of the sexual relationship 
that precedes Freud’s dialectic of pleasure and unpleasure. In other words, such a 
suffering as an enhancement and potential maximisation of entropy cannot correspond to 
a non-human unpleasure as excitation (and thus an increase of energy), since in the 
absence of the sexual relationship there is no human homeostat on this level. Second, 
the suffering of primitive jouissance as language’s uncontrolled “falling” or dispersion 
can nonetheless be delimited discursively as an unpleasurable excitation (which slows 
down entropy) thanks to the staging of the loss of the object. Yet to the extent that this 
fabricated absence of jouissance concomitantly evokes and maintains the ideal of an 
absolute jouissance as perfect satisfaction – of a pleasure that would go beyond the 
removal of unpleasure, but which would actually amount to maximum entropy – it is not 
disposed of but repeated in the drive. The by now subjectivised human animal therefore 
concretely lives really existing jouissance as a contradictory pleasure-in-pain, which 
cannot just be reduced to Freud’s hypothesis of an all-encompassing “primary 
masochism”.  
Undoubtedly, a certain homeostatic equilibrium emerges at this stage with regard 
to the human animal’s basic physiological functions, but the latter are in turn subsumed 
under plus-de-jouir. Even orgasm as a pleasurable discharge of unpleasurable excitation 
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is thoroughly overdetermined by the not-so-disagreeable quest for a partner, the 
enjoyable awkwardness of foreplay, and the doubts as to why one did not like it “that 
much” and as to whether it was really “worth” the effort or a useless waste of time. 
Now, it is crucial to stress that such an economy of plus-de-jouir duly 
corresponds to an economy of knowledge. In Seminar XVII, Lacan indeed defines 
knowledge as “a means of jouissance”.66 The absence of the sexual relationship is 
mitigated discursively thanks to the loss of the object as a containment of entropy. More 
precisely, unbound primitive – and already linguistic – jouissance turns into plus-de-jouir 
(as “no more” jouissance, “more” jouissance, and jouissance as an object-waste) through 
the emergence of a symbolic savoir (S2) for which the master signifier (S1) represents 
the subject as split ($). That is to say, “the [object] a, as such, is strictly speaking what 
follows from the fact that, at its origin, knowledge is reduced to an articulation of 
signifiers. This knowledge is a means of jouissance. And, I repeat, when it is at work, 
what it produces is [circumscribed] entropy”.67 Concomitantly, “there is not only the 
dimension of entropy in what takes place on the side of plus-de-jouir”, but also 
knowledge, and knowledge itself “implies an equivalence between this [circumscribed] 
entropy and information”.68  
Yet, again, inasmuch as there is an attempt to totalise information – information 
that as such increases differentiation – and eradicate the loss that structurally goes with 
it, the very slowing down of entropy carried out by discursive knowledge does also 
enhance entropy – or indifferentiation – discursively. The means of jouissance as a 
subjectivisation of entropy into symbolically lived experience are contradictorily also the 
means towards jouissance as the ideal of an absolute presence to be retrieved, which in 
point of fact would coincide with maximal entropy. In Lacan’s caustic formulation, it is 
precisely insofar as “we have ended up considering to be natural the mollycoddling that a 
society that is more or less orderly maintains us in” – and there is no society outside 
discourse69 – that “everyone is dying to know what would happen if things went really 
bad”.70 
In other words, discourse does not only constantly “touch on” jouissance since it 
itself “originates” from a delimitation of unbound jouissance into plus-de-jouir71 – in this 
sense, really existing jouissance cannot but be a jouis-sens, an enjoy-meant. Discourse 
also “arouses [jouissance] again” (qua the purely entropic absence of the sexual 
relationship) to the extent that it endeavours to “return to this origin”, which it mistakes 
for a perfect satisfaction still achievable by means of absolute knowledge.72  
In Seminar XVII, Lacan is very clear on this pivotal point and on the fact that it 
must lie at the basis of any possible intervention of psychoanalysis in the field of politics 
(“the intrusion into the political can only be made by recognizing that the only discourse 
there is […] is the discourse of jouissance”73). On the one hand, the conservational circuit 
of the drive – which is far from necessarily conservative in a political sense, quite the 
contrary – repeats a return of jouissance in the guise of a loss of jouissance, or plus-de-
jouir. Lacan contends that the reiteration of this flaw or failure is as such productive. As 
seen, it coincides with the production of information. More comprehensively, the 
repetition of the production of the loss of jouissance is at the same time what produces 
an increase of knowledge as an anti-entropic increase of levels of differentiation. But, on 
the other hand, this very “search for jouissance as repetition” also “goes against life” 
insofar as it encompasses a totalising – if not totalitarian – desire to “return to the 
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inanimate”, where the latter is confused with the full presence of an “ideal point”.74 
Throughout Seminar XVII, Lacan unequivocally presents the desire at stake as an 
indifferentiating desire to know, to know it all, and thus at bottom to know what would 
happen if things went really bad, as still manifestly witnessed by our current fascination 
with virological, ecological, and technological figures of the Apocalypse. Adopting the 
terminology of Seminar XX, we could also call it a desire to be One in order to absolutely 
enjoy through and in (sexual) knowledge, a desire which instead leads to maximal 
entropy. Lacan also graphically warns us that it does not take long for knowledge as a 
means of jouissance to turn a tickle – a vividly emblematic example of the pleasure-in-
pain of plus-de-jouir – into a blaze of petrol: “Knowledge is also that. In principle, nobody 
wants to overuse it, and yet it’s tempting to”.75 
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